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of the PDA. With support from business
groups and the Reagan administration,
petitioners claimed that the PDA requires
pregnant workers to be treated the same as,
but not better than, workers with other
disabilities. Based on the legislative history
behind the enactment of the PDA, the
Court agreed with the court of appeals'
conclusion that its purpose is to provide
"a floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not a ceiling
above which they may not rise." Guerra,
758 F.2d at 396. The 1978 amendment was
passed specifically to overturn a 1976 Supreme Court decision in General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 ( 1976) which
had held that discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy was not sex discrimination
under Title VII. The Court further explicated that Congress intended the Act "to
provide relief for working women and
to end discrimination against pregnant
workers," and that had Congress intended
to prohibit preferential treatment, it could
have expressly done so within the PDA
itself. In support of this latter conclusion,
the Court noted similar state statutes in
force at the time the PDA was enacted, and
the House and Senate reports which suggested that these laws would continue in
effect under the Act. Finally, the Court
found that§ 12945(b)(2) of the California
statute is not inconsistent with the PDA
because both "achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group ... of employees over
other employees." 474 U.S. __ (1986),
citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
u.s. 424, 429-430 (1971).
The last part of petitioners' claim stated
that § 12945(b)(2) requires employers to
violate Title VII because they cannot comply with both the federal and state law. The
Court was quick to invalidate this argument, stating that the California statute
merely establishes benefits that employers
must provide to pregnant workers, and
that it does not prevent employers from
giving comparable benefits to other disabled employees. In sum, the Court denied petitioners' facial challenge to§ 12945
(b)(2), ruling that the special benefits provided by the statute as construed by the
Fair Employment and Housing Commission do not violate federal civil rights laws.
"By taking pregnancy into account," Justice Marshall said, "California's pregnancy
disability leave statute allows women, as
well as men, to have families without losing their jobs." 474 U.S. __ (1986).
In his dissenting opinion, Justice White
felt that the California statute was "in
square conflict" with the federal law because it requires "every employer to have a
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disability leave policy for pregnancy even
if it has none for any other disability."
Therefore, the state statute is pre-empted
by the federal law. In pointing to the plain
language of the PDA, Justice White wrote
that it clearly mandates equal treatment
for employees, including pregnant workers,
and that it does not intend pregnancy to be
in a class by itself within Title VII. Further, the minority felt that the Court's interpretation of the PDA with respect to the
state statute places an unfair burden on California employers by requiring them to implement new minimum disability leave
programs to satisfy both the state and federal laws.
The effect of this decision on other state
statutes is clear. While not mandating the
type of preferential treatment afforded in
California, the holding in Guerra evidences
the Court's willingness to uphold similar
statutes in the future as non-violative of
discrimination laws. Those states which
decide to enact preferential treatment
statutes may find that they discourage employers from hiring women.
Maryland has included pregnancy in its
fair employment practices laws, but not to
the same extent as California. Article 49B,
§ 17 of the Annotated Code of Maryland
could not be construed as requiring the
"special treatment" involved in Guerra.
The statut~ merely calls for equal treatment with respect to pregnancy, stating
that any insurance or sick leave plan "shall
be applied to disability due to pregnancy
or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities subject to the provisions
of this section." (Emphasis added).

-Barbara E. Wixon
Chase v. State: LEON"GOOD
FAITH" EXCEPTION TO THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
EXTENDED TO PROBATION
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS.

In a case of first impression, the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland in Chase v.
State, 68 Md. App. 413, 511 A.2d 1128
(1986) ruled that generally, the exclusionary
rule may not be applied to probation revocation proceedings. In so holding, the
court of special appeals has followed the
trend of a majority of other jurisdictions.
Appellant Jerome Edwin Chase was
convicted of robbery by the Circuit Court
for Prince George's County. His sentence
was suspended in favor of five years probation. Two years later, after he had already been cited and resentenced for probation violations, Chase was arrested and
charged with intent to distribute marijuana and simple possession. While the

criminal case was pending, the State filed a
petition to revoke Chase's probation; alleging a failure to "obey all laws." At the trial
for the criminal charges, the trial court
found the Appellant's arrest to be without
probable cause and suppressed the evidence
recovered from him at the arrest. Two
months later, the State dismissed the criminal charges. However, the petition to revoke Chase's probation was not dismissed.
At his probation revocation hearing, Appellant moved {based on the exclusionary
rule) to have the evidence seized at the
time of his arrest suppressed, or have the
proceeding dismissed. The court, in denying Chase's motion applied a balancing
test and determined that "the probation
process and community safety interests far
outweigh any deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule." In light of their finding, the
lower court therein ruled that the exclusionary rule did not apply to probation revocation proceedings.
In dealing with this case of first impression, the court of special appeals traced the
chronological history of the exclusionary
rule at the Supreme Court level from Wolf
v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) to the
present. Judge Wilner, writing for the majority, noted that even before Mapp v.
Ohio, 364 U.S. 643 (1961), [which overturned Wolf v. Colorado, when it held that
"all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is,
by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court;" Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643], "the
[Supreme] Court has viewed the exclusionary rule as a deterrent rather than a
redressive measure", Chase, 68 Md. App.
at 419, 511 A.2d 1128. Atthe end of their
historical analysis, the court herein recognized the fact that the balancing test [established in U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 894
( 1984)] "remains an integral part of the
decisional law in this area." Chase at 420,
511 A.2d 1128. In Leon, the Supreme Court
actually retracted the exclusionary rule by
withdrawing its application to evidence
obtained in reasonable reliance on a search
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate
which was later found to be unsupported
by probable cause. The deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule on the police would
be insignificant and is greatly outweighed
by its detrimental effect on criminal prosecutions.
In their analysis of Maryland case law on
the application of the exclusionary rule,
the court of special appeals looked to
Logan v. State, 289 Md. 460, 425 A.2d
632 (1981), where the Court of Appeals of
Maryland adopted the ruling of U.S. v.
Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir.) cere. denied
429 U.S. 894 (1976) and declined to extend the exclusionary rule to sentencing

proceedings. The court of appeals' rationale was that the exclusionary rule's additional deterrent effect would be insignificant or is greatly outweighed by its
detrimental effect. However, the court
therein concluded that if it can be shown
that the illegally obtained evidence provided an incentive for the illegal seizure,
the exclusionary rule would then apply.
Such incentive would be evidenced by proof
that seizure of the evidence was motivated
by the possibility of enhancing the accused's sentence. See Logan, 289 Md. at
486 and Lee, 540 F.2d at 1212.
The court in Chase also analyzed how
evidence falling under this category is handled in probation revocation proceedings
nationwide. Although the court noted
semantical differences in the various approaches, it found that the prevailing approach applied is the "cost/benefit analysis". "A probation revocation proceeding
is not a criminal prosecution but is more in
the nature of an administrative hearing intimately concerned with the probationer's
rehabilitation. Thus, the court must balance the competing interests of the community with the rehabilitative goal of probation." Chase, 68 Md. App. at 422, 511
A.2d 1128. In light of this standard, the
court concluded that the exclusionary rule
generally did not apply to probation revocation proceedings. Combining Maryland
case law with the semantical variations
that exist nationwide, the court then incorporated a good faith exception into
their newly adopted rule. In discussing
their standard, Judge Wilner wrote:
We agree, as a general proposition, that
the deterrent effect of such an application [of the exclusionary rule] will be
minimal and that whatever marginal
deterrent benefit might accrue would
be far outweighed by the harmful effect of denying access to relevant information concerning a probationer's
behavior.... [Nevertheless], [w]e cannot permit the police to use this as an
incentive to violate the Fourth Amendment .... [W]e think the best way to
deter individual violations is simply to
apply the exclusionary rule upon a
showing that the police did not act in
good faith in effecting the search and
seizure. The "good faith" standard ...
encompasses all aspects of the officer's
actions- how egregious the violation
was, whether the officer knew the person was on probation ... , what the circumstances were that led to the seizure.
Chase, 68 Md. App. at 425, 426, 511 A.2d
1128.
In concluding their discussion of the "good
faith" exception, the court held that the

burden is on the defendant initially to produce lack of good faith. Upon this production, the burden then shifts to the State to
prove otherwise.
At the time of publication this case was
set for argument before the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Although the court of
appeals granted certiorari, it is doubtful
that the case will be reversed because the
court of special appeals' reasoning follows
the national trend. Chase should help in
lessening the frustration the law enforcement community feels in their pursuit of
justice and community protection. It remains to be seen whether their pursuit will
become a reality.
-Christopher Hale

jersey Shore State Bank v. United
States: IRS NOT REQUIRED TO
PROVIDE NOTICE AND A
DEMAND FOR PAYMENT TO
A THIRD-PARTY LENDER PRIOR
TO INITIATING A CIVIL SUIT TO
COLLECT EMPLOYMENT TAXES
In Jersey Shore State Bank v. United
States, 479 U.S. __, 87-1 U.S.T.C.
para. 9131 (1987}, the Supreme Court in a
unanimous decision held that the IRS was
not required to provide notice and a demand for payment to a third-party lender
who is liable under I.R.C. § 3505 prior to
initiating a civil suit to collect employment
taxes. This decision resolved a conflict between the circuits and is consistent with
the interpretation of the Third and Ninth
circuits.
The Supreme Court in Jersey Shore State
Bank considered the relationship between
I.R.C. § 3505 (which provides for personal
liability on the part of third parties paying
or providing funds for wages) and I.R.C.
§ 6303(a) (which requires that notice of an
assessment be provided to persons liable
for unpaid taxes before an assignment can
be imposed}. In rejecting the bank's claim
that the government was required under
I.R.C. § 6303(a) to provide notice and demand for payment to a lender bank that is
liable under I.R.C. § 3505, the Court
determined that a third-party lender is not
the "person" intended to be protected under I.R.C. § 6303(a).
I.R.C. § 3505 applies to a third-party
lender, surety or other person who is not
an employer, but who pays wages either
directly to that employee or group of employees, or supplies the funds to pay those
employees. I.R.C. § 3505(a) imposes liability on those lenders, sureties or persons
for a sum equal to any unpaid withholding
taxes and interest if the wages were paid
directly to the employee. However, under
I.R.C. § 3505(b), if they did not pay the

employees directly, but provided the funds
to the employer, their liability would be
limited to 25% of the amount of the loan.
Prior to this section's enactment in 1966,
the employers were the only individuals
subject to liability.
I.R.C. § 3505 was enacted in order to
correct problems which occurred when
employers obtained net payroll financing.
United States v. Jersey Shore State Bank,
781 F.2d 974, 976 (3d Cir. 1986). Net payroll financing, used frequently in the construction industry, is a practice whereby
the lender provides funds for payment of
employees' net wages, but not for payment
of withholding taxes. This type of financing usually results when a financially
strapped sub-contractor cannot meet its
payroll obligations. The general contractor will then pay the sub-contractor's employees' net wages. Problems arise when
the sub-contractor is unable to pay withholding taxes to the government while the
government is required to credit the employees account. In such cases "[r]ecourse
against the employer [is] often fruitless,
because it [is] frequently without any financial resources. And the government
could not proceed against third parties
who paid the net wages because they were
not 'employers' under the code, and therefore not liable for the taxes." United States
v. Jersey Shore State Bank, 781 F.2d 974,
976 (3d Cir. 1986).
In the current case, Jersey Shore State
Bank provided net payroll financing to
Pennmount Industries, Inc., from the
fourth quarter of 1977 through the first
quarter of 1980. The government in its
complaint alleged that Jersey Shore paid
wages directly to Pennmount employees
and supplied funds for the purpose of paying wages, with the knowledge that Pennmount did not intend to or would not be
able to make timely payments or deposits
of the federal taxes required to be deducted
and withheld. The complaint also alleges
that the Bank's liability is $76,547.57
plus interest under I.R.C. § 3505(a}, and
$72,069.00 plus interest under I.R.C.
§ 3505(b). The district court granted the
bank's motion for summary judgment because of the government's failure to provide timely notice as required by I.R.C.
§ 6303(a). The United States appealed and
the third circuit reversed. In examining
the legislative history of the statute, the
third circuit concluded that 6303(a) did
not apply to collection actions under 3505
because 6303(a) was intended to protect
taxpayers from harsh administrative collection procedures. The court noted, however, that under I.R.C. § 3505, the thirdparty lender was not in danger of having
any of its property seized or attached to
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